Our 42 hardware scenarios expose the capacity denominator and omitted costs. Download the model; it does not claim rentable supply or attack feasibility.
Dotted-underlined terms open a quick definition. Close it to keep reading.
A “51% attack cost” estimate can be wrong before it reaches a hardware price. If an attacker adds capacity A while honest miners keep capacity H, the relevant share is A / (H + A). Adding 51% of H gives only 33.77% of the enlarged total. Reaching 51% requires about 1.0408 times H in additional capacity.
We publish 42 declared hardware-capacity scenarios to make that distinction inspectable. They are not a quote for an attack, proof that machines are available, or a prediction of reorganization success. The old edition’s precise rentable-capacity and feasibility claims lacked preserved evidence and have been removed.
Two different capacity assumptions
Fix the definition before pricing hardware
Situation
Equation
What is being assumed
Capacity redirected from an existing total
Share = controlled work / existing work
The total is not enlarged by that redirection
Entirely new capacity joins unchanged honest miners
q = A / (H + A); A = qH / (1 − q)
Honest capacity remains online and unchanged
Example: A = 0.51H
q = 0.51 / 1.51 = 33.77%
Not a majority of the enlarged total
Example: target q = 0.51
A = 1.0408163265H
Additional capacity exceeds H
These are alternative models, not two costs to add together. Real fleets, pools, rentals and miner responses can mix assumptions. A reported pool share also does not prove that a single organisation owns or can redirect all the underlying machines.
Illustrative honest baseline of 3 PH/s. The values are capacity arithmetic, not observed rentable hashpower. Download SVG.
Machine equivalents under one declared baseline
The table fixes honest capacity at an illustrative 3 PH/s and target share at 51%. It uses manufacturer specifications and displayed prices frozen on 30 September 2026. It rounds machine counts upward. Some listings were sold out or offered future delivery. A unit price cannot be multiplied into evidence that a manufacturer can deliver an entire fleet at that price.
New-capacity scenario; cooling and facilities excluded
Configuration
Machine equivalents
Gross listing multiplication, $m
Machine power, MW
Energy $/h at $0.10/kWh
Antminer L7 9050M
345,022
249.80
1,124.08
112,408
Antminer L9 16G
195,154
655.72
655.72
65,572
Antminer L11 20G
156,123
1,464.43
574.53
57,453
Antminer L11 HU2 35G
89,213
1,464.43
515.21
51,521
ElphaPex DG2+
152,315
1,530.00
594.03
59,403
Goldshell MINI DOGE III PLUS · default
3,854,876
1,827.21
1,927.44
192,744
Goldshell MINI DOGE III PLUS · low power
5,036,209
2,387.16
1,510.86
151,086
The complete CSV varies the honest baseline across 1.5, 3 and 4.5 PH/s, and the target across 51% and 60%, for seven configurations. MINI DOGE’s two modes are alternatives for the same hardware, not two separate products to buy. Manufacturer tolerances and actual wall measurements are outside this model.
Why the capital column is not an attack budget
A delivered installation adds freight, duties, electrical infrastructure, cooling, site work, failures, maintenance and financing. Acquisition lead time and available inventory can dominate the result. Running costs also have to account for legitimate revenue and opportunity costs; electricity expenditure alone is not the net cost of malicious activity.
Conversely, an actor already controlling machines does not need to buy the same fleet again. A hardware acquisition table answers a new-capacity hypothetical, not the opportunity cost for every possible adversary. We provide no verified rental-market census and no statement that an attack is commercially feasible or impossible.
What a majority of work does not override
still validate signatures and permitted issuance. A majority of does not give somebody the to your . Reorganizations can nevertheless undermine recent settlement assumptions. The exact outcome depends on the threat model and recipient acceptance policy; there is no universal safe count.
The developer account of the March and April 2026 MWEB incidents describes a validation exploit and a later disruption with an invalid-chain reorganization. It should not be relabelled as evidence of a conventional majority- attack. Absence of a documented attack in an article is also not a mathematical security guarantee.
Reviewed against the linked materials on 2 October 2026. Calculations and drafting were AI-assisted; no independent external review or personal attendance is claimed. Original publication date retained. See our corrections policy.
Mining
In brief Searching for valid proof of work and proposing Litecoin blocks that other nodes independently check.
Searching for proof of work and assembling candidate blocks that follow a network's rules. Validating nodes independently check proposed blocks. An accepted Litecoin block can pay its miner the permitted subsidy and transaction fees; a pool participant is paid under the pool's scheme.
For example An ASIC connected to a pool contributes proof-of-work attempts; the pool pays according to its published scheme.
Common mistake Comparing coin revenue without subtracting electricity, pool charges, downtime and equipment costs.
In brief A participant running network software; a full node checks rules but need not keep all old block files.
A participant running network software. A full node independently validates rules; a pruned full node can discard older block files after validation. Not every node stores the complete historical blockchain.
For example A pruned full node checks the chain but later discards old block files to reduce disk use.
Common mistake Assuming every node is a miner, or that pruning means it skipped consensus validation.
In brief A system where miners compete to find valid hash results, while nodes independently check the resulting blocks.
A system in which miners search for a hash satisfying a network difficulty target. Litecoin uses Scrypt for this work; Bitcoin uses double SHA-256. Validating nodes still check all the block's rules, not only its proof of work.
For example A miner searches for valid work, while nodes check that the resulting block also follows the transaction and consensus rules.
Common mistake Thinking proof of work alone lets a miner spend someone else's coins or choose any subsidy amount.
In brief Secret data a wallet uses to sign spending; one key may cover only part of a wallet and must never be shared.
Secret data used to authorize spending under the conditions attached to coins. In a simple single-key wallet, anyone with that key can spend the coins it controls. A wallet may manage many keys; never share them.
For example A wallet signs a spend using a private key; the recipient only needs your payment, not that secret key.
Common mistake Sharing a key with support or assuming one exported key necessarily backs up every address in a wallet.
Compare: Seed phrase vs private key
Seed Phrase
Recovery words used by many wallets to rebuild key material; the correct format, optional recovery passphrase and wallet settings still matter.
Private Key
A secret used to authorize spending under its key conditions; one exported private key is not necessarily a backup of every key a wallet uses.
One example A fictional simple HD wallet can derive several receiving keys from one recovery setup; exporting just one of those private keys does not preserve the others.
Remember: Identify the complete backup method for the original wallet, keep secret recovery material offline and never paste it into this website.
In brief Software or a device for managing wallet keys and payments, though a watch-only setup cannot sign on its own.
Software or a device that manages keys and helps you receive and send Litecoin. Coins are recorded on the blockchain. A watch-only wallet can show addresses and transactions without holding the keys needed to spend.
For example One wallet can generate several receiving addresses and still show them as a single combined balance.
Common mistake Thinking coins live inside the app, or that seeing a balance proves that the wallet can sign a spend.
In brief A transaction gains confirmations as blocks build on its inclusion, but those confirmations can fall if chain history changes.
A transaction receives its first confirmation when included in a block in the accepted chain. Each block then built on top adds another. A chain reorganization can reduce or remove the count. The recipient decides how many confirmations it requires. Litecoin targets an average 2.5-minute block interval; individual blocks can arrive sooner or much later.
For example A transaction in the latest accepted block has one confirmation; the next block raises that count to two.
Common mistake Confusing a wallet's sent message, a TXID or mempool visibility with the first confirmation.
In brief The rate of proof-of-work attempts; a network-wide figure is estimated and depends on the calculation method.
The rate of proof-of-work hash attempts, usually expressed per second. Network hash rate is estimated from blocks and difficulty rather than directly counted. Compare figures for the same algorithm; a higher rate alone does not establish decentralization or mining profitability.
For example One PH/s represents one quadrillion hash attempts per second; compare only figures for the relevant mining algorithm.
Common mistake Comparing Litecoin and Bitcoin hash-rate numbers as if Scrypt and SHA-256 work had identical costs.
In brief A group of transactions linked to the previous block under the network's rules.
A batch of transactions accepted under the network rules and linked to the previous block. Litecoin targets one new block every 2.5 minutes on average; a particular block may arrive sooner or much later.
For example Your payment may wait unconfirmed and then receive its first confirmation when a miner includes it in an accepted block.
Common mistake Treating the 2.5-minute target as a countdown or a maximum wait for your payment.
Content review recorded: 2026-10-02. The review record does not identify a separate independent reviewer. An edited date above records an edit, not a new fact-check. AI-assisted editing or new artwork alone does not complete a source review.
Next scheduled review: 2026-11-01. This review is due.
Editor-in-chief of Litecoin.watch and founder of MyBank.pl. His published work covers foreign exchange, financial education and Litecoin. On Litecoin.watch, his remit includes editorial direction, source transparency and the practical guides and research published by the site.